Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
History Faculty Publications

Department of History

2009

From Cowries to Coins: Money and Colonialism in the Gold Coast
and British West Africa in the Early 20th Century
Harcourt Fuller
Georgia State University, hfuller@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_facpub
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Fuller, H. “From Cowries to Coins: Money and Colonialism in the Gold Coast and British West Africa in the
Early 20th Century.” In Money in Africa, edited by Catherine Eagleton, Harcourt Fuller, and John Perkins,
54-61. London: British Museum Research Publications, 2009.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Publications by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

From Cowries to Coins: Money and Colonialism in the
Gold Coast and British West Africa in the Early
20th Century
Harcourt Fuller
Introduction
This paper explores the validity of the arguments articulated
by the British colonial administration and business interests in
favour of the institution of a colonial common currency system
in British West Africa in 1912 (see Fig. 1). It also aims to provide
an analysis of the extent to which the native populations
accepted or challenged the new colonial monetary order. Given
its centrality to Britain’s colonial project in West Africa, the
Gold Coast (which was renamed Ghana in 1957 after gaining
independence) will be used as a case study (see Fig. 2). The
chapter explores how the loss of politico-monetary sovereignty
in the Gold Coast was occasioned by the coming of colonialism,
and the establishment of a colonial monetary system in the
form of the West African Currency Board (WACB). The WACB
managed the production and design of a common currency for
the British possessions in West Africa, namely, The Gambia,
Sierra Leone, The Gold Coast, Northern and Southern Nigeria
(see Fig. 1).1 However, the Board faced numerous challenges in
maintaining its monetary monopoly on West Africa before and
after the First World War. Analysing the history of the WACB is
significant because it provides insights into the manner in
which early 20th century British colonial policy was formulated
in London and executed in the colonies. As A.G. Hopkins
attests:

century, Africans had their own currencies. African societies
and kingdoms used monies such as cowry shells, gold nuggets
and dust, iron rods, manillas and cloth currency. In the Gold
Coast as well as the other British territories in West Africa, the
indigenous currencies and United Kingdom silver coinage were
largely replaced by the West African Currency Board
currencies (see Table I), which were issued after 1912 when the
WACB was established. This colonial currency became the sole
legal tender for British West Africa in 1912 and was to cover a
total area of 451,000 square miles (116,808,464ha) and a
combined population of over 18 million people.3
Eric Helleiner argues that during the age of imperialism,
currency boards were created by European powers in their
respective colonies for economic ends, including the reduction
of international and intra-colony transaction costs, and to
promote imperial political identities.4 The creation of the West
African Currency Board confirms his argument. Its
establishment was due to the recommendations of the Report
of the West African Currency Committee (WACC), a body
commissioned by the Rt. Hon. Lewis Harcourt, M.P., Secretary
of State for the Colonies. The mandate of the Committee was:
To inquire and report as to the desirability of introducing into West
Africa a special silver coinage common to the five British West
African administrations, and also as to the desirability of
establishing a joint issue of currency notes in the same territories,
and to advise upon the measures necessary for the regulation of
the special coinage if introduced or for the better regulation of the
existing currency in the event of a special coinage not being
adopted.5

There was an imperial monetary policy… and the solution
propounded with respect to West Africa was fully consistent with
that policy.2

This examination also enables us to gauge the effectiveness of
the African responses to monetary colonization.
The introduction of colonial coinage to West Africa
Before the formal introduction of colonial coins and paper
money in British West Africa in the first quarter of the 20th

While economic considerations were central to the
establishment of the Board in West Africa, it also had political
ramifications for the local populations. It deprived Africans of
the ability to develop and control an indigenous monetary
system that would give their leaders greater political autonomy

Table 1: Legal tender coins in the five West African administrations, 1912
Administration

Legal tender without limit

Limited legal tender

British gold

Foreign gold

Foreign silver

British

Local

Foreign

1. Sierra Leone and
2. Gambia

All gold and silver
coins legally current
in the UK

Certain French,
Spanish and American
gold coins

5-franc pieces of
the Latin Union

All bronze coins
legally current in the
UK

nil

nil

3. Gold Coast and
Dependencies

ditto

nil

nil

ditto

Nickel-bronze 1/10 of a
penny, half-penny and
1-penny pieces

nil

4. Southern Nigeria
(Western Province)

ditto

Certain French,
spanish and american
gold coins

nil

ditto

ditto

nil

5. Northern Nigeria
and Southern Nigeria
(Eastern and Central
Provinces)

ditto

nil

nil

ditto

ditto

nil

Source: NA: CO 984/2, WACC Report, ‘Statement of the coins which are now legal tender in the five West African administrations’, 2

54 | Money in Africa

Money in Africa | 55

Figure 1 Colonial West Africa (1903/1912), with British colonies highlighted. Scale 1/6,336,000 or 1 inch to 100 miles. Source: NA: CO 984/2, April 1903 and August 1912, ‘Map of West Africa’
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from the colonial administration. Prior to the publication of the
Report, the WACC consulted with 22 of what the Report termed
‘witnesses’, including the five colonial governments and
business interests, such as the major banking and maritime
establishments operating in British West Africa.6 None of the
people consulted regarding the new currency system were
African however.7 What does this exclusion of indigenous
economic and political interests tell us about the aims of the
incoming monetary regime? It appears that the British colonial
authority was not aiming to empower Africans to take the
reigns of a modern economic and monetary system as top-level
administrators. Rather, it is evident that the aim was to replace
an existing, albeit less modern economic system across the
colonies, with a modern British system. It also appears that
Africans were not thought to be capable of, or desired to be,
active stakeholders in the ensuing monetary order. This
evaluation on the part of the colonial and business officials,
that Africans lacked the experience to participate in the new
system, as we shall see below, was not completely accurate or
justified.
Factors for change
Before 1912, colonial officials and their business counterparts
contended that the most widely-circulating medium of
exchange in British West Africa was United Kingdom silver
coinage. Moreover, a variety of legal tender foreign currencies
were also in circulation in the region at the time the WACC
Report was published, as Table 1 shows. At the same time
barter trade and traditional African currencies constituted the
major aspect of trade in many rural areas.8 For example, in the
Gold Coast Colony, while coin transactions dominated the
urban areas, cowry shells enjoyed widespread usage mainly in
more remote areas. Gold dust, the Akan all-purpose money,
was also used as currency for larger transactions in rural
parts.9 The presumed negative situation in the Colony of
Ashanti and the Protectorate of the Northern Territories (see
Fig. 2) also contributed to the complexity and urgency of
implementing a new colonial currency order. Overall, the
WACC found that the Gold Coast and Dependencies were:
In a backward state as regards the employment of metallic
currency. In Ashanti, however, the use of British silver is stated to
be making rapid progress, and gold is said to be considerably in
demand by cattle traders in Coomassie [Kumasi], mainly for the
purpose of trade with French territory. In the Northern Territories
the natives still employ cowries for the small transactions of the
market, but silver is gradually coming into use, and five-franc
pieces are in demand by traders from French territory, and stand at
a premium in relation to British money.10

The characterization of metallic money in the British
territories as being in a ‘backward state’ was not an entirely
accurate assessment of the monetary reality in British West
Africa. This is evident if we take the case of an important
Dependency of the Gold Coast Colony, namely, Asante. The
success of the British forces in the Yaa Asantewaa War of
1900-01 resulted in the political annexation of Asante and its
incorporation into the Gold Coast Colony. While the use of
British metallic money was not common there at the time,
Asante metallic currency, namely gold dust, was the currency
of choice for official and commercial trade and transactions.
Furthermore, gold dust currency was not only important in
cattle trading with French territories, but in a variety of
56 | Money in Africa

Figure 2 The Gold Coast and Dependencies. Source: Wrangham 1999

commercial transactions beyond the confines of British
authority. T.C. McCaskie, in his two-part article,
‘Accumulation, wealth and belief in Asante history’, reveals the
extent to which the Asante state and its commercial sector was
economically developed with regard to money and trade. In the
late 19th century, the Asante state had a fiscally functioning
and effective system of accountancy, taxation and even a
‘national’ treasury. The latter was a kind of state bank called
the ‘Great Chest of the Treasury’, which was located in the
palace of the Asantehene in Kumasi, where gold dust (metallic
money) was deposited.11 In the 20th century, moreover,
successful Asante entrepreneurs and traders operating
between Asante and the Gold Coast Colony used gold dust
currency to trade in commodities including gold, rubber, cocoa
and timber. They also provided services as moneylenders, gold
dealers, investors, retailers, transportation suppliers and urban
developers. Asante businessmen were also involved in the
import-export trade.12 Therefore, for at least one major segment
of the Gold Coast Colony and Dependencies, there was a
complex economic and political system, with a central
administrative authority, banking infrastructure and money
that enabled trade to take place. However, McCaskie
acknowledges that the advent of British ‘laissez-faire capitalism
and the colonial cash economy’ ushered in a new economic
regime that would eventually replace the local monetary
order.13
The need to eliminate the competing foreign and native
currencies in Britain’s West African territories through
monetization was also seen as being more crucial given the
need to collect taxes. Helleiner explains:
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a particularly important colonial objective was that of bringing
peasants in colonial societies into a monetized economy as
taxpayers, wage labourers in colonial enterprise, and producers of
cash crops for export.14

For example, by mandating that poll taxes be paid in the
colonial currency, the state forced its subjects into the exportoriented cash crop economy and other colonial ventures, where
they were paid with said currency. This situation contributed
to resistance and resentment of that system by colonial
subjects.15 Secondly, British coins were imported into the
colonies by two private banks, namely the African Banking
Corporation (ABC, which was established in Lagos in 1892) and
the Bank of British West Africa, Ltd (BBWA).16 These banks had
‘special arrangements’ which amounted to an exclusive
contract with the imperial government to supply currency to
the colonies.17 Britain paid for freight and other miscellaneous
expenses for supplying silver coins to the colonies, ‘in return
for prepayment in the United Kingdom of its nominal value’.18
After the ABC ceased operations in 1893, the BBWA, which had
opened up in Lagos in 1894, took over these functions from the
former by securing an exclusive agreement with the Lagos
government on 4 May 1894. The BBWA subsequently set up
operations for the supply of British coins in the Gold Coast and
the other British West African colonies; it had one branch in the
Gambia, two in Sierra Leone, eight in the Gold Coast, five in
Southern Nigeria, and one branch in Northern Nigeria.19
Therefore, Britain effectively privatized the importation and
repatriation of silver coins in the colonies by contracting it out
to big banking interests. These Banks operated by charging
merchants and traders a 1% premium for supplying them with
British coinage. However, merchants, traders and other
stakeholders in the colonies had contested the preferential
treatment afforded the ABC and demanded a more egalitarian
system. Merchants complained of the Bank’s monopoly of the
currency supply, the 1% premium that they had to pay for
coinage and that other banks in the colonies were ‘prejudiced
by these arrangements’.20 This contestation would bring about
the cancellation of the contract that the ABC (and later the
BBWA) had with the government and usher in a new monetary
regime under the auspices of the WACB in 1912.21
It is clear from the foregoing reports of squabbling between
the British colonial officials and the expatriate merchants, and
the jostling for power and influence between the latter
themselves, that the monetary and banking debates and the
reforms enacted during this period took place above the heads
of the local African populations. Helleiner’s argument, that the
cash-poor in the colonies were only important in terms of the
need to incorporate them into the cash economy as taxpayers
and not as important decision makers and stakeholders in the

new monetary order, is therefore a plausible one. Moreover, the
colonial banks, businesses and officials were also insensitive to
the monetary needs of African entrepreneurs, often asserting
that Africans were not credit-worthy. The British banks
(namely Barclays Bank (DCO) and BBWA) operating in the
colony catered mainly to the government, expatriate and nonAfrican interests, and failed to extend adequate credit (or any
at all, in some cases) to Gold Coasters.22 Moreover, as Uche
explains, the colonial authorities had outlawed locally
chartered banks in 1906, which removed a valuable source of
credit for Africans and essentially paved the way for the
establishment of the colonial common currency system.23
Another major factor, which the WACC pointed out in its
Report in support of monetary change, was the increasing
demand for British currency in the colonies, particularly in
British West Africa. It noted that there was ‘a direct inducement
to over-issue, because new silver has, in some places, a special
value for the purposes of native trade’.24 From 1886–1911, British
West Africa had had a significant increase in the circulation of
British currency, at times surpassing the coin circulation in the
British Isles itself (see Table 2). The Committee speculated
that, the potential for British coins to return into circulation in
London, was more likely during an economic depression, and
the possibility that this could destabilize the imperial economy,
made the issue of West Africa having its own independent
currency more urgent. The Committee found that:
the continued issue of the silver coins of the United Kingdom to the
West African Colonies is [in]compatible with the successful control
of its token coinage by the Home Government without the
introduction of radical changes into its financial system… the use
of sterling silver in West Africa without limit of tender has now
become so considerable as to contain elements of danger, which
are intensified by the steady increase of the circulation, and which
affect the interests both of the United Kingdom and of British West
Africa.25

Ironically, the demand for British currency in West Africa
was attributed to expanding merchant activities, greater
colonial penetration and opening up of the territories, and the
replacement of indigenous trading practices such as barter
with modern British currency, which now jeopardized the
metropolis, monetarily.26
The profitability of a new system of currency to the colonial
governments and mercantile classes was also a significant
factor in the establishment of the WACB regime. As the
Committee put it:
there will, of course, be a very large ‘profit’ representing the
difference between the bullion and face value of [special] silver
currency supplied to British West Africa. That country [sic] has
absorbed over 6 ½ million pounds (face value) in silver coin during
the past 26 years, and the absorption may be expected to continue,
even if not at the same rate.27

Table 2: Circulation of British sterling silver in the UK, West Africa & other territories
Period

West Africa

United Kingdom

Average for the period 1886–1890
1891–1895
1896–1900
1901–1905
1906–1910
1911

£
24,426
116,323
257,090
262,786
666,190
874,850

£
920,088
761,039
796,425
234,150
781,073
1,219,766

Other territories
£
255,939
124,461
367,233
231,504
325,347
286,575

Source: NA: CO 984/2, WACC Report, ‘Analysis of British sterling silver issued for circulation in West Africa in the United Kingdom and in other sterlingusing Territories’, 6.
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The Committee continued that the new currency ‘should be
a source of considerable ultimate profit to the colonial
governments concerned’.28 The admission that the issuance of a
special colonial currency would be a profit-making venture
within itself undermines the previous assertions that it was just
fear that the continued circulation of British coinage in Africa
posed a direct risk to the home government. Profit, in addition
to the risk of loss, therefore were the main driving forces
behind the establishment of the WACB. Therefore, colonial
officials and British merchants in West Africa worked together to
advance their own interests, which overlapped for the most part.
While officials in London and their colonial counterparts in West
Africa sought to protect the political and monetary interests of
the home government, expatriate merchants worked to protect
their commercial interests and profit-base. The latter lobbied
heavily for a new monetary system in the colonies mainly
because it represented direct control of the machinery of money
making to augment their coffers.
After outlining all the factors affecting the currency
situation in the territories, the WACC concluded that:
the introduction of a distinctive silver currency… is therefore…
the only practicable measure that we are in a position to suggest for
removing the defects of the present monetary conditions of West
Africa.29

This recommendation resulted in the creation of the West
African Currency Board in 1912 and the establishment of a
common colonial currency for Britain’s five possessions in the
sub-region. For a small service charge, the WACB coins and
banknotes were made convertible into British sterling when
presented at any of the currency centres in Accra, Bathurst,
Freetown or Lagos. The equivalent amount in pound sterling
would be paid into the customer’s account in London.30 The
establishment of this colonial currency system in 1912 signalled
the emergence of a new era in West African history. Whereas
the pre-1912 period was characterized by the political
consolidation of the colonial state at the expense of the vast
majority of the peoples, the post-1912 era proved to be a major
monetary victory for Britain. However, this monetary
advancement would be tempered by several challenges, most
notably the resilience of traditional currencies and the coming
of a World War two years later.
Colonial currency designs
The WACB authorities confronted several challenges to their
new monopoly on money. Firstly, they had the daunting task of
making the new currency popular with and acceptable to
Africans. In this regard, the WACC Report had highlighted ‘the
importance of not giving the natives any ground for
discriminating between the new coins and those with which
they have been familiar in the past’.31 The Committee found
that:
the native is suspicious of change, and that it might take a long time
to overcome any prejudice on his part against the new silver… if
the new coins bear the King’s head on the obverse and are of the
customary denomination, size, and weight, very little difficulty
need be anticipated on this score. When it is remembered that the
coins now in common circulation in West Africa include five
florins, five shillings, and five sixpences bearing five different
effigies of three different monarchs on the obverse… the
justification for this view becomes obvious.32

As Cusack has argued with respect to stamp designs, the
58 | Money in Africa

Figure 3 1-shilling coin 1916 (palm tree, King George V)

empire was ‘to be represented by the alternating heads of Kings
and Queens’.33 Therefore, minting the head of King George IV
on the WACB coinage was not only meant to ensure consistency
with previous designs, but also to symbolize the absolute,
centralizing power around which the colonized territories and
peoples would be consolidated. Similarly, Mwangi has found
that, in the case of the East African Currency Board (EACB),
the colonial authorities were adamant about keeping the coin
and note designs consistent (by minting the effigy of the
reigning British Monarch on the face of EACB coinage) so as to
maintain public confidence in the money’s value.34 In addition
to the British sovereign’s head, the other prominent image of
the WACB coinage was of the geographical terrain mostly in
the form of a palm tree (see Fig. 3). These images subtly
reinforced the monarch’s lordship over the people and colonial
landscape; there were no images of Africans. It was only after
the 1948 Accra Riots, which resulted in greater agitations by
nationalists for political and monetary independence, that the
WACB began to include imagery of Africans on their
banknotes. Nonetheless, the natives were mainly portrayed as
happily engaged in export-designated cash-crop (groundnuts,
cocoa and palm oil) production, reinforcing notions of colonial
hegemony and the civilizing mission.35 There are several
assumptions that the WACB made about the nature of ‘natives’
that warrant analysis. Describing them as being ‘suspicious of
change’ and therefore needing some convincing signals, a
certain colonial mindset that Africans (perhaps unlike
Europeans) were resistant to change, that is, traditional and
averse to modernity. Secondly, the Committee overestimated
the familiarity and popularity of colonial coinage among
locals. While the circulation of British currency increased over
time, the majority of peasants would not have frequently used,
or had access to, this currency. Moreover, the use of cowrie,
gold dust and other forms of traditional currencies showed a
resilience to being eradicated that undermined the rapidity
with which the colonial administration wanted its coinage to
circulate.
Coins, paper money and World War I
As the previous section demonstrated, the ‘native question’ was
always one of the principal considerations and challenges for
the success of the new monetary regime. On the issue of the
Africans’ acceptance of the new coinage, the Committee had
been quite confident; ‘There is little reason to doubt that coins
of the proposed new currency would be well received by the
native population, if certain precautions were taken’.36
Unfortunately, the new coinage issued in 1913 went into
circulation just before the beginning of the First World War.
During WWI, the WACB and the Clifford colonial government
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Figure 4 5-pound banknote 1954 (palm trees, river, natives harvesting palm nuts)

faced even more difficulties in currency administration in the
Gold Coast. Silver was scarce worldwide, creating a shortage of
silver coinage, which severely affected trade of farm produce,
cocoa, mining and other essential commodities. The shortage
of coinage was also created by the high expense of sending the
Gold Coast Regiment expedition to fight on Britain’s behalf in
East Africa.37 However, silver shortage wasn’t the only problem.
The nickel-bronze coinage introduced by the WACB in 1912
were being used in the marketplace for everything from
making small change to ornaments, gambling counters and
washers for galvanized iron roofing. The hole in the nickelbronze coins also made them usable as jewellery.38 The
shortage of currency was further complicated by London’s
inability to supply the colonies with adequate coinage on the
one hand. On the other, locals also tended to melt down coins
for jewellery-making, hoard coins and were reluctant to put
their money in the banks. Fluctuating cocoa prices also put
further strains on the limited supply of coinage in the Gold
Coast. Furthermore, London officials remained indifferent to
the locals’ disdain for, and culturally related reluctance to use,
paper money.39
If convincing the locals that the coins issued by the WACB
after 1912 were just as good as the previous British coins in
circulation, then the issuance of paper money was even more
difficult, especially during World War I. Coin or metallic money
had intrinsic value and therefore was thought to be more
‘tangible’ than banknotes, which depended on ‘real’ money
(gold or silver) to guarantee its value. The Committee duly
recognized this challenge. ‘It is clear that the success of a note
[paper money] issue in British West Africa must depend on the
willingness of an appreciable part of the native population to
use this form of currency, which is at present unknown to
them’.40 But how would the WACB try to ensure this loyalty and
‘willingness’ of the native population to use the new form of
currency? There was always the option to use force, but the
Committee discounted the suggestions by some witnesses to
resort to force, as ‘the prospect of ultimate success would be
prejudiced if at any early stage notes were forced on natives
who preferred coin’.41 Given these challenges, Governor
Clifford found himself in a diplomatic dilemma. On the one
hand, he tried to pressure the WACB and the Colonial Office to
supply more silver coinage and hold back on issuing paper
money too soon in the Gold Coast. On the other, he tried to
temper the wartime instability and anxieties in the colony and
implored the native population to have more confidence in
paper money. The Governor even initially rejected London’s
advice to issue paper currency to ease the coin shortage, given

the locals’ resistance to paper money.42
Given the special circumstances and hardships of the War,
why were ordinary Africans so picky about paper? As
Wrangham shows, there were practical and cultural causes for
their resoluteness.43 The tropical climate made paper easy to
deteriorate, susceptible to fire and to consummation by white
ants. Furthermore, the typical ‘pocketless’ cloth attire of the
native population made it hard to carry around paper money; it
was easier for them to tie their silver coins into knots on their
cloth.44 Despite these problems, the WACB decided to introduce
non-legal tender paper currency in late 1916, but this was met
with unsubstantiated success.45 However, by the end of the war,
a combination of the shortage and high price of silver and
nickel-bronze currency forced the Clifford government to
confer legal tender status on the WACB banknotes (Figs 4, 5).
Notwithstanding, the WACB banknotes were met with
resistance. For example, some market places from the Northern
Territories to the Coast, and even some workers in the formal
sectors refused to accept paper currency as payment since
many did not regard it as real money. Some farmers, for
instance, preferred to sell their cocoa on credit than accept
paper money. Ashanti Goldfields mine-workers in Obuasi were
initially paid only 15% of their salary in banknotes after the
introduction of bills, and some workers for the West African
Rubber Plantations company were adamant about not being
paid in paper.46 Given the currency shortages during World War
I, the use of barter and cowry shells still continued, especially
in the Northern Territories, Eastern Province, Ashanti and
other rural zones.47 Moreover, in the post-1918 period, paper
money continued to be unpopular with the locals. In some
cases, if paper money were accepted for transactions, its value
would be discounted.48 However, in September 1920 the

Figure 5 1-shilling banknote 1918 (with image of 1 shilling coin)
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introduction of a new mixed-metal coinage contributed to a
more stable currency environment, coinciding with the
fluctuations of the post-war economy.49 Consequently, the
British colonial authorities formulated a massive marketing
campaign to ensure the success of the new currency both
within as much as outside of their colonial borders.
Conclusion
The coming of coinage to British West Africa in the first quarter
of the 20th century, was occasioned by several coinciding
factors. There were economic considerations, including: the
reduction of monetary transaction costs, between Britain and
its colonies and within its colonies; better macro-economic
management, and the extraction of seigniorage profits by the
colonial governments.50 These reasons were especially fuelled
by the increasing circulation of British currency in West Africa
and the fear that unfavourable economic conditions there
would cause the repatriation of coins to Britain, which could
destabilize the home economy.51 Hopkins also rightly claims
that the WACB was established ‘to settle expatriate commercial
rivalries in West Africa’, among the banking, shipping and
other trading interests competing for the spoils of the
‘Scramble for Africa’.52 London officials and their
administrators in the colonies, on the one hand, sought to
protect the monetary system of the home government from the
negative effects of oversupply of British currency in the
colonies. On the other hand, colonial administrators on the
ground and their expatriate commercial allies viewed the
establishment of a colonial currency system as a way to make a
profit from seigniorage.
Ideological and politically, monetization represented the
last two projects of what missionary and explorer David
Livingstone identified as the three C’s of British imperialism in
Africa, namely, Christianity, Civilization and Commerce.
Colonial authorities demonetized a variety of local monies
(manillas, cowry shells, gold dust, etc.) and foreign colonial
currencies (French, American, Latin Union, etc.) that
circulated concurrently with the pound sterling. Colonial
money was thought to be superior to African currency, and the
incorporation of Africans into the world of taxation and waged
labour was vital to the success of the colonial machinery.53
Moreover, the images of the reigning British monarchs and the
territorial landscape that were minted on colonial coinage and
paper money were symbolic of Great Britain’s lordship over the
colonized.
The convergence of British colonialism and the WACB’s
monopolization of currency in the Gold Coast in 1912 signalled
the loss of political and monetary sovereignty for the
indigenous population. The demonetization of pre-colonial
currencies
produced significant losses for Africans, especially those who held
much of their fortune in these forms of money. Without a formal
monetary role, cowry shells could only now be sold for their lime
content at very low values.54

It also forced Africans into colonial enterprises such as the
production of cash crops, much of the proceeds of which went
into paying taxes and other expenses that were only accepted
in colonial currency.
Notwithstanding this loss of politico-monetary autonomy,
Gold Coasters, through passive and active strategies resisted
60 | Money in Africa

the colonial monetary regime throughout the entire period.
These subversive measures included the continued use of
indigenous and foreign currencies, counterfeiting colonial
coins and banknotes,55 defacing currency, melting down money
to make jewellery, and refusing to use bank notes. According to
Mwangi,
through the medium of conflicting currencies… the Africans…
without resorting to heroic political action, defied and resisted
through their daily lives the ambitions of the [colonial] state.56

Political action came in 1957 when Ghana achieved
independence from Britian. As I argue in another article, Prime
Minister Kwame Nkrumah sought to establish Ghana’s status as
an independent nation-state by breaking from the WACB
colonial common currency and establishing the Ghana pound
in 1958 and cedi and pesewa currency in 1965 – embellished
with nationalistic symbols and iconography.57
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